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INTRODUCTION

Teresa Sheehan was a fifty-six-year-old woman with a
schizoaffective disorder.' She lived in a cooperative housing program for
adults with mental illness, and, in August 2008, a social worker began
to worry about her health. 2 Heath Hodge grew concerned when Teresa
refused to eat, take her medication, or speak with her psychologist. 3
When Heath entered her second-floor room without her permission,
Teresa screamed: "Get out of here! You don't have a warrant! I have a
knife, and I'll kill you if I have to."4 Believing she required professional
evaluation, Heath left the room and completed an application for
Teresa's temporary detention at a psychiatric facility.5 He then called
the police and asked for help to safely escort her there. 6
When two law enforcement officers arrived at Teresa's
residence, Heath detailed her history of mental disability and violent
threats.7 Using a key from the facility, the officers unlocked her door
and entered her room." Teresa picked up a kitchen knife and exclaimed:
"I am going to kill you. I don't need help. Get out."9 The officers
retreated from the room, drew their service weapons, and called for
backup.1 0 However, instead of waiting for reinforcements or taking
actions to de-escalate the situation, they swiftly forced their way back
into Teresa's room and shot her several times." The officers later
explained that, with the door closed, they grew concerned that Teresa
could escape through her second-story window or gather more
weapons. 12 The officers never paused to consider whether or how to
accommodate Teresa's mental illness. 13 They acted-without
consideration of her known disability-and the results were
devastating.

1.
City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2015); Nadja Popovich,
Police Shooting of Mentally Ill Woman Reaches US Supreme Court. Why Did It Happen at All?,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/23/police-shootingmentally-ill-teresa-sheehan-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/24RP-32UN].
2.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1769.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 1769-70.
5.
Id. at 1770.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1771.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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The circumstances of Teresa's police encounter are, tragically,
not unusual. Although she survived her arrest, people with severe
mental illness are at least sixteen times more likely to be killed during
a police encounter than other individuals. 14 Given the documented role
of mental illness in fatal police shootings,1 5 amending police response
tactics and increasing mental health training is critical.
A high arrest rate and lack of appropriate police procedures
contribute to the disproportionate injury and death of people with
mental illness during arrest. 16 Roughly ten percent of police calls
involve a person with mental illness," and such individuals are seven
times more likely to be arrested than the general population.1 8
Misperceptions of mental illness, greater incidences of homelessness
and substance abuse, along with inadequate police training, community
support, and affordable mental health treatment, result in this
comparatively high arrest rate. 19 Additionally, there are numerous
barriers inhibiting proper police response, including a lack of sufficient
training to identify and accommodate mental disabilities, resource and
time constraints, and the widespread misperception that "persons with

14.
Law

Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the Undercounted:The Role of Mental Illness in Fatal
Enforcement

Encounters,

TREATMENT

ADVOC.

CTR.

1,

12

(2015),

http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QTG-86MF] ("By all accounts-official and unofficial-a minimum of 1 in 4 fatal
police encounters ends the life of an individual with severe mental illness . . . . [I]n one U.S. city
and several other Western countries-the findings indicate that mental health disorders are a
factor in as many as 1 in 2 fatal law enforcement encounters.").
15. Fuller et al., supra note 14, at 1-3, 12.
16. Jennifer Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Correcting Discrimination of
Persons with Mental Disabilitiesin the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and PretrialProcesses, 23 LAW & INEQ.
157, 169-72 (2005); see also Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People:
Defining the Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against
Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 264-65 (2003) (describing the
high incidence of police encounters with people with mental illness and how "in some of these
situations, police officers shoot and seriously injure or kill the disturbed person"); Fuller et al.,
supra note 14 (quantifying the higher incidence of injury and death of people with mental illness).
17. See Avery, supranote 16, at 262-63 (discussing a study that estimates that seven to ten
percent of police calls involve an individual with mental illness); Randy Borum et al., Police
Perspectives on Responding to Mentally Ill People in Crisis:Perceptionsof Program Effectiveness,
16 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 393, 393-94 (1998) (same); Fuller et al., supra note 14, at 1 ("[I]ndividuals
with severe mental illness generate no less than 1 in 10 calls for police service.").
18. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 165-66 (citing Jeffrey Draine et al., Role of Social
Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and Homelessness Among Persons with Serious Mental
Illness, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 565, 566 (2002)); Linda Teplin, CriminalizingMental Disorder:
The Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 794 (1984) ("[For
similar offenses, mentally disordered citizens had a significantly greater chance of being arrested
than non-mentally disordered persons."); see also Borum et al., supra note 17, at 394 ("[Mlost
people with severe mental illness will experience at least one arrest and many will be arrested
more than once.").
19. Fischer, supra note 16, at 165-74.
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a mental illness are more prone to violence." 20 These factors-coupled
with an untreated illness-can and do lead to heartbreaking results for
everyone involved.
Police mistreatment of people with mental disabilities has
provoked numerous lawsuits. 2 1 Traditionally, plaintiffs have brought
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute. 22
However, there are a number of obstacles to a § 1983 claim. Most
notably, the doctrine is inconsistent and underinclusive, 23 and police
officers are often immunized from liability. 2 4 These barriers have made
it progressively more difficult for someone mistreated during arrest to
succeed in a § 1983 claim. Over the past fifteen years, however,
alternative claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act 2 5 ("ADA")
and the Rehabilitation Act 26 ("Rehab Act") have become increasingly
viable. 27
This Note examines the feasibility of a police discrimination
claim for individuals with mental disabilities under the ADA.
Specifically, it analyzes whether Title II of the ADA requires law
enforcement officers to accommodate a person's mental illness during
the course of arrest, and if it does, what the proper standard is for
evaluating the legality of police conduct. Part I analyzes the text and
purpose of the ADA. It emphasizes the statute's broad protections and
focuses on Title II, which prohibits a public entity from discriminating

20. Id. at 169-71.
21. See, e.g., Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 172-73 (4th Cir.
2009) (ADA claim brought when a woman with mental illness was shot and killed by police, who
were called to her home when a friend had not heard from her in several days); Thompson v.
Williamson County, 219 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2000) (father of an individual with mental illness
brought suit under § 1983, the Rehab Act, and the ADA after his son was shot and fatally wounded
by police after another family member called 911 for help transporting him to a hospital); Hainze
v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 2000) (Section 1983, Rehab Act, and ADA claims brought
when an individual with mental illness was shot and killed by police, who were called to the scene
after the man threatened suicide).
22. Avery, supra note 16, at 265. A majority of these cases claim violation of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Id.
23. Id. at 266 ("As a result of this inconsistent doctrine, judges and juries, without giving
adequate consideration to all relevant factors, have found police shootings of emotionally disturbed
people to be reasonable.").
24. The doctrines of qualified, municipal, and sovereign immunity, as well as interlocutory
appeal, limit § 1983's applicability in the context of arrest. James C. Harrington, The ADA and
Section 1983: Walking Hand in Hand, 19 REV. LITIG. 435, 436-40 (2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
27. See Harrington, supra note 24, at 437, 440-63 (detailing how the ADA and Rehab Act
have, in part, filled the void left by § 1983 decisional law).
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against an individual with a disability 28 and requires "reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures."2 9
Part II analyzes the multiple and incongruous approaches that
the U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted to evaluate whether people
with mental disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodations
during arrest. Section II.A analyzes the preliminary question of
whether Title II applies to police conduct during arrest. Assuming that
it does, Section II.B analyzes the competing standards and exceptions
for evaluating whether police conduct is illegally discriminatory. It
examines the wrongful arrest and reasonable accommodation theories,
as well as two potential exceptions to the latter theory: exigent
circumstances and direct threats.
Part III proposes a solution to the circuit split. It concludes that
Title II of the ADA requires reasonable accommodation during arrest
for people with mental disabilities. This conclusion, supported by a
majority of the circuit courts, gives effect to the plain language, broad
purpose, and policy considerations of the ADA. In a departure from the
majority, however, this Note also proposes limiting the scope of the
exigencies and direct threat exceptions and outlines suggested
modifications to the investigation and arrest of people with mental
illness.
I. THE ADA: A REVOLUTIONARY PROMISE TO PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES

The ADA is the most significant and comprehensive legislation
ever enacted to prohibit discrimination against and provide
accommodations for Americans with physical and mental disabilities.30
Section L.A discusses the Act's widespread impact and purpose,
highlighting congressional intent to reach all public contexts. Section
I.B focuses on Title II of the ADA-the provision that arguably provides
a remedy for individuals with mental illness who are unjustly harmed
during arrest. It analyzes Title II's text, implementing regulations, and
judicial interpretations.

28. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
29. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016).
30. Martin Schiff, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct, Its Antecedents, and Its Impact On
Law Enforcement Employment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 869, 869 (1993).
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A. The ADA's Sweeping NondiscriminationProtections
"[A] breathtaking promise"; 3 1 the "Emancipation Proclamation
for [people] with disabilities"; 3 2 an act that "[enables] the shameful wall
of exclusion [to] finally come tumbling down" 33-these are a few of the
phrases used to describe the ADA. Enacted in 1990, the ADA affords
broad protections to individuals with disabilities by prohibiting
discrimination in employment; 34 public services that state and local
governments, departments, and agencies provide; 35 all public
accommodations, including certain private entities that operate public
services; 36 and all telecommunications.3 7 In particular, Congress
emphasized the importance of eliminating discrimination in the
"critical areas" of "employment, housing, public accommodations,
education,
transportation,
communication,
recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services." 38
The breadth and purpose of the ADA reveal congressional intent
to eliminate widespread societal discrimination against people with
disabilities. Indeed, the ADA's express purpose is to provide "a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 39 Moreover, in its
findings, Congress recognized the prevalent societal disadvantage that
people with disabilities face: "historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 40 Its
concerns are also evidenced in its definition of a qualified individual
with a disability, 41 which highlights the need for "reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices [and] the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers." 42
31.

Fischer, supra note 16, at 177 (citing MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 175

(2000) (quoting disability rights advocates)).
32. Id.
33. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS (July 26,
1990).
34. Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012).
35. Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2012).
36. Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2012).
37. Title IV, 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2012).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
41. See infra Section I.B.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012); see Fischer, supra note 16, at 179 ("The language of the ADA
shows an understanding by Congress that the environment society has constructed through its
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Congress specifically intended to eliminate discrimination
against people with mental disabilities by all public entities. Title II of
the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 43 This
mandate contains no statutory exceptions.4 4
B. Title II: Discriminationby a Public Entity
In order succeed in a Title II claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) a public entity
excluded her from participation in or denied her the benefits of its
services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against
her; and (3) such exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by reason of
her disability.4 5
First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is disabled and
qualified.4 6 The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual." 47 An individual is "qualified" if, with or without
reasonable modifications, she is otherwise qualified to participate in or
receive the benefit of the services of a public entity. 48 As the Supreme
Court held in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, a
person with a disability is not disqualified from ADA protection because
of imprisonment, suspected criminal behavior, or involuntary
participation in an activity. 49
Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate exclusion, denial, or
discrimination by a public entity.5 0 A "public entity" encompasses "any
State or local government" or "any department, agency, special purpose
policies, practices, and structures often excludes those with disabilities and is thus a form of
discrimination.").
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
44. See id.
45. Id.; see Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014)
(defining the Title II standard); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir.
2007) (same); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (defining "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications, . . . meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity").
49. 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (finding that the ADA protects inmates in state prisons).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government."5 1 There is no statutory exception to this definition, and
the Supreme Court has held that Title II can "appl[y] in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress." 52 As the Court stated, "[Title II]
plainly covers state institutions without any exception."53
Additionally, although the statute does not define "services,
programs, or activities" or "benefits," these terms have been interpreted
broadly by many sources. Section 504 of the Rehab Act, which is
coextensive with Title II for these purposes, 4 defines "programs and
activities" to include "all of the operations of [a public entity]."5 5
Moreover, a Department of Justice ("DOJ") regulation provides that
Title II "applies to all services, programs, and activities provided or
made available by public entities." 56 The "benefit" requirement is also
broad-the Supreme Court interpreted it to include any "theoretical
benefit," even to individuals who are involuntarily confined.5 7
Unlawful discrimination, pursuant to a DOJ regulation,
includes a failure to make "reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability."5 8 Whether an accommodation
is reasonable and necessary is a question of fact determined on a caseby-case basis. 59 Generally, the modification must be proportional and
congruent to the circumstances, must be efficacious, and must feasibly
enhance access to or benefit from the public entity's activities. 60
However, a public entity need not "employ any and all means" of
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).
52. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (stating that even if Congress "did not 'envisio[n] that the ADA
would be applied to state prisoners,'" this would demonstrate the breadth of Title II, rather than
its ambiguity).
53. Id. at 209.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(b), 12201(a) (2012); see also Penn. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 118 F.3d
168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ("Congress has directed that Title I of
the ADA be interpreted in a manner consistent with Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b),
12201(a) . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Guidance on ADA Regulation on
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35, app. B (2016) ("The scope of title II's coverage of public entities is comparable to ... section
504 ... in that title II applies to anything a public entity does.").
56. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
57. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210 ("Modern prisons provide inmates with many recreational
'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'programs,' all of which at least
theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners.").
58. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016).
59. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014); Fulton
v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 2009); Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d
171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085-86 (11th Cir. 2007);
Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002).
60. Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 784.
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accommodation. 6 1 Indeed, a modification is unreasonable if it would
"fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity" 6 2
or impose an "undue financial or administrative burden." 63 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to allow a temporary
delay in modification if a public entity demonstrates that "immediate
relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the
State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse
population of persons with mental disabilities." 6 4
Congress likely intended the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate
to apply to arrest. A House Judiciary Committee report 65 and a
transcript from a congressional debate 66 directly address Title II's
application in this context. The Committee report suggests that proper
police training can satisfy the reasonable modification requirement:
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often necessary to provide
training to public employees about disability. . . . [Plersons who have [disabilities] are
frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers have not received
proper training in the recognition of and aid for [their disability]. . . . Such discriminatory
67
treatment based on disability can be avoided by proper training.

A subsequent DOJ guidance document echoes the Judiciary
Committee's statement: "[L]aw enforcement [is obligated] to make
changes in policies that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of
individuals with disabilities."68
Finally, a plaintiff must prove that the public entity's exclusion,
denial, or discrimination was "by reason" of her disability. 69 While not
defined in the statute, courts have interpreted this element to require
some sort of nexus between the plaintiffs disability and the public

61. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-32 (2004).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32.
63. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32. Notably, neither Title II nor its implementing regulations
expressly impose an "undue burden" limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(7). This is in contrast to Title I and Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012); 42
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
64. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604-06 (1999).
65. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 50 (1990).
66. 136 CONG. REC. H2599-01, H2633-01 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levine):
One area that should be specifically addressed by the ADA's regulations should be the
issue of nondiscrimination by police. Regretfully, it is not rare for persons with
disabilities to be mistreated by the police. Sometimes this is due to persistent myths
and stereotypes about disabled people. At other times, it is actually due to mistaken
conclusions dawn [sic] by the police officer witnessing a disabled person's behavior. . ..
[T]hese mistakes are avoidable and should be considered illegal under the [ADA].
67. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 50.
68. Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State
and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B (2016).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
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entity's discrimination or the requested accommodation. 70 Courts have
applied varying standards, ranging from "but for" causation71 to
deferring to a plaintiffs own judgment on what modifications are
related to and necessary for her disability. 72

II. THE CONTEXT OF ARREST: MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS OF
TITLE II OF THE ADA

People with mental disabilities are substantially more likely to
be injured or killed during a police encounter than the general
population. 73 Despite this alarming trend, some courts contest whether
these individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations during
arrest. 7 4 In particular, the circuit courts disagree as to whether Title II
applies in this context. 75
It is not disputed that mental illness is a qualifying disability
under Title JJ76 or that a police department and its officers are public
entities.7 7 Likewise, there is general agreement that police have a duty
to reasonably accommodate a disability after arrest and during
transportation to a police station or mental health facility.7 8 However,
70. See Note, Three Formulationsof the Nexus Requirement in Reasonable Accommodations
Law, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1392, 1392-94 (2013) (analyzing the numerous causation standards courts
have adopted in the context of reasonable accommodation claims).
71. See, e.g., Wis. Cmty. Servs. v. Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2006) ("'[B]ut for'
his disability, he would have been able to access the services or benefits desired."); Alboniga v. Sch.
Bd., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ("The ADA imposes only a 'but-for' causation
standard for liability.").
72. See Note, supra note 70, at 1406-07 (citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d
Cir. 2003), a Title II case that "deferred to the expansive notion of disability and its effects that
the plaintiffs presented").
73. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that Title II does
not apply to arrest).
75. Compare Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799 (finding that Title II does not apply to arrest), with
Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that Title
II does apply to arrest), Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th
Cir. 2009) (same), Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (same), and
Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
76. The ADA explicitly recognizes mental impairment as a qualifying disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1) (2012).
77. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799 (finding these elements undisputed and that "[t]he broad
language of the statute and the absence of any stated exceptions has occasioned the courts'
application of Title II protections into areas involving law enforcement").
78. See, e.g., Hainze, 207 F.3d at 802:
Once the area was secure and there was no threat to human safety, [the police officers
are] under a duty to reasonably accommodate [an individual's] disability in handling and
transporting him to a mental health facility. [This situation is] squarely within the
holdings of [Yeshey] and the cases that have followed.;
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1998) (allowing a Title II claim to proceed when a
paraplegic man was injured during transport after his arrest); see also Roberts v. City of Omaha,
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courts do not agree on whether Title II affords protection to people with
disabilities immediately before and duringarrest.79 Moreover, assuming
that Title II covers arrest, there is further divergence over how to
properly evaluate police actions and the sufficiency of accommodations,
especially when the individual is mentally ill and violent.8 0 This Part
analyzes the multiple and incongruous approaches courts have adopted
to evaluate whether Title II applies to the context of arrest, and if it
does, what the proper standard is for evaluating the legality of police
conduct.
A. Does Title II Apply to the Context of Arrest?
People with mental disabilities are entitled to reasonable
accommodations during arrest only if Title II applies to the police
officer's conduct during arrest. The scope of Title II is particularly
contentious when an arrestee is perceived as violent and dangerous.8 1
In such instances, some courts have held Title II inapplicable, as
competing safety concerns excuse the officers from any duty to modify
their practices and policies. 82 However, other courts find this
interpretation contrary to the plain language and purpose of the ADA. 8 3
This Section analyzes the two competing approaches.
1. The Fifth Circuit Approach
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that
Title II does not apply to the arrest of a person with mental illness.8 4 In
Hainze v. Richards, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a police officer's Title II
723 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he ADA ...
appl[ies] to law enforcement officers taking
disabled suspects into custody."); Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir.
2012) (finding that the ADA applies to police detentions and interrogations).
79. Compare Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799 (finding that Title II does not apply to arrest), with
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (finding that Title II does apply to arrest), Waller, 556 F.3d at 175
(same), Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (same), and Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 (same).
80. Compare Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 (finding that Title II applies to arrest, but declining to
evaluate the viability of a claim under a "reasonable accommodation" theory), with Sheehan, 743
F.3d at 1232 (recognizing the viability of a "reasonable accommodation" theory), Waller, 556 F.3d
at 175 (same), and Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (same).
81. Compare Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799 (finding that Title II does not apply when an arrestee
is perceived as violent and dangerous), with Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (finding that Title II applies
to the context of arrest, regardless of whether the arrestee is violent and dangerous), Waller, 556
F.3d at 175 (same), Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (same), and Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 (same).
82. See, e.g., Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (recognizing an exigent circumstances exception to Title
II); Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt about
"fitting an arrest into the ADA at all").
83. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit approach); Waller, 556
F.3d at 175 (same); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (same); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 (same).
84. Hainze, 207 F.3d at 800.
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liability after he shot and injured Kim Hainze, a man with a history of
depression who was acting erratically.8 5 In this incident, a family
member called 911 when Kim threatened suicide or "suicide by cop" in
the parking lot of a convenience store.8 6 When the police arrived, Kim
was holding a knife and talking with two unidentified individuals in a
nearby vehicle.8 7 The officer immediately exited his patrol car, pointed
his firearm at Kim, and instructed him to step away from the vehicle.8 8
When Kim instead yelled profanities and walked towards the officer,
the police shot him multiple times in the chest. 8 9 The entire encounter
lasted twenty seconds.9 0
Kim Hainze, who narrowly survived, brought a claim against the
police for a failure to provide reasonable accommodations under Title
11.91 He argued that, under the circumstances, the officer should have
"engaged him in conversation to calm him," attempted to "give him
space by backing away," or used other less deadly tactics "to defuse the
situation." 92 In addition to these on-the-scene modifications, he argued
that the police department should have adequately trained its officers
to protect people experiencing a mental health crisis. 93 Instead, he
claimed, the police treated his crisis "identical to [a] criminal response
call[ ]."94

The Fifth Circuit dismissed Kim Hainze's claim, finding that
"Title II does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to reported
disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls
involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officers securing
the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life." 95 The
court justified its holding by highlighting the exigencies that can arise
during arrest, in what courts and commentators later deemed the
"exigent circumstances exception" to Title II.96 This categorical
85. Id. at 801.
86. Id. at 797. "'Suicide by cop' refers to an instance in which a person attempts to commit
suicide by provoking the police to use deadly force." Id. at 797 n.1L
87. Id. at 797.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 800-01.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 801.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2014)
(discussing the "exigent circumstances exception"); Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville,
556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); Fischer, supra note 16, at 194-95 (same); Steven E. Rau
& Gregory G. Brooker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Public Emergencies: Is There an
"Exigent Circumstances"Exception to the Act?, FED. LAw., Sept. 2010, at 38, 39-41 (same).
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exception, which has no textual support in the ADA, permits an officer
to discriminate against an individual with a disability when there is a
perceived safety risk to the police or general public. 97 The Fifth Circuit
explains:
Law enforcement personnel conducting in-the-field investigations already face the
onerous task of frequently having to instantaneously identify, assess, and react to
potentially life-threatening situations. To require the officers to factor in whether their
actions are going to comply with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and
prior to securing the safety of themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would
pose an unnecessary risk to innocents.

98

In sum, police and public safety is the priority and, as the court
suggests, a police officer should not be forced to take the "unnecessary
risk" of evaluating whether his or her actions discriminate against
individuals with disabilities.9 9
The Fifth Circuit's approach has been followed by a few other
courts. In Rosen v. Montgomery County Maryland, the Fourth Circuit
expressed skepticism towards "fitting an arrest into the ADA at all."100
However, more recent decisions from the Fourth Circuit,10 1 as well as
the Supreme Court, 102 call into question Rosen's precedential value.
Additionally, in Patricev. Murphy, the Western District of Washington
held that "an arrest is not the type of service, program, or activity from
which a disabled person could be excluded or denied the benefits." 103
However, the Ninth Circuit abrogated this decision in 2014, when it
held in Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco that Title II
applies to arrest.104
2. The Majority Approach
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's approach, the Fourth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits agree that arrests are within the scope of

97. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (describing its safety justification).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997).
101. See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that
the ADA applies to police investigations of criminal conduct that do not result in arrest, thus
narrowing Rosen); Waller, 556 F.3d at 175 (suggesting that Title II does apply to the context of
arrest).

102. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (finding that an individual
with a disability is not disqualified from ADA protection by reason of imprisonment or suspected
criminal behavior, nor because participation in the activity is involuntary, thus calling into
question the basic assumptions in Rosen).
103. 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
104. 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014).
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In Gohier v. Enright, the Tenth Circuit held that "a broad

rule categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title II .

.

. is not

the law." 106 In Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, the Eleventh Circuit
concurred, finding the plain language and express purpose of Title II to
support the inclusion of arrest.1 0 7 It rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach
in Hainze, explaining:
[T]he question is not so much one of the applicability of the ADA because Title II prohibits
discrimination by a public entity by reason of [an individual's) disability. The exigent
circumstances presented by criminal activity . . . go more to the reasonableness of the
1 08
requested ADA modification than whether the ADA applies in the first instance.

In Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, the Fourth Circuit
reserved judgment on Hainzel09 but nonetheless analyzed a Title II
reasonable accommodation claim in the context of arrest. 110 Like the
Eleventh Circuit, it held that exigencies bear "on the inquiry into
reasonableness under the ADA.""'l Finally, in Sheehan, the Ninth
Circuit "agree[d] with the majority of circuits to have addressed the
question that Title II applies to arrests." 112 Looking to precedent and
the plain text of the statute, it held that Title II applies to "anything a
public entity does," including arrest. 113
While in agreement that Title II extends to arrest, the courts
disagree on the textual reasoning. 114 Title 11 provides that no qualified
individual with a disability shall "be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

105. Id.; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175; Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th
Cir. 2007); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. 186 F.3d at 1221. Because Gohier predated Hainze, it did not comment on the Fifth
Circuit's approach. See id. at 1219-21 (surveying the case law on the issue without mentioning
Hainze).
107. 480 F.3d at 1085.
108. Id.
109. 556 F.3d at 175 (noting that an evaluation of the Fifth Circuit's holding "is a broader
proposition than is needed to decide this case").
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Sheehan
in 2015, however, before evaluating the merits of the Title II question, dismissed it as being
improvidently granted. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1773-74
(2015).
113. 743 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.
2002)).
114. See id. (emphasizing the first clause of Title II); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d
1072, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing the second clause of Title II); Gohier v. Enright, 186
F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); see also Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773-74 (recognizing these
two relevant provisions, but declining to comment on their applicability because the question was
improvidently granted).
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15 The
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."s
disjunctive "or" has caused debate over whether Title II reaches only
the "services, programs, or activities" of a public entity or whether the
latter clause "or be subjected to discrimination" extends Title II's
protection to anything a public entity does.1 1 6 Further, assuming the
clauses are independent, the courts disagree over which properly
encompasses police conduct during arrest.1 17
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits agree that there are two
separate textual bases for a Title II claim-either (1) a person is
excluded from or denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities;
or (2) a person is otherwise subjected to discrimination by the public
entity.118 In Gohier, the Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to evaluate
whether safety during arrest is a "benefit" of police "services, programs,
or activities" because there is a "second basis for a Title II claim." 119 The
court held that a plaintiff could be "subjected to discrimination" during
the course of arrest and thus that Title II applies. 120 Similarly, in
Bircoll, the Eleventh Circuit declined to analyze whether police conduct
during arrest is a service, program, or activity.121 The court held that
the "final clause in Title II [ ] 'is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.' "122
The Ninth Circuit has held the first clause of Title II to apply to
police conduct during arrest.1 23 In Sheehan, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted "programs, services, or activities" to broadly encompass
"anything a public entity does," including arrest. 124 In support for its
holding, the court cited Barden v. City of Sacramento, a Title II case
involving the city's failure to maintain accessible sidewalks.1 25 In
Barden, the Ninth Circuit looked to the broad language of Title II, its
express purpose to provide a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities," and legislative history supporting its extension to "all
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (emphasis added).
116. See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1084-85 (recognizing the circuits' debate and emphasizing the
disjunctive language); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220 (emphasizing the disjunctive language).
117. Compare Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (first clause), with Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1084-85
(second clause), and Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220 (second clause),
118. See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1084-85 (recognizing the two textual bases); Gohier, 186 F.3d at
1220 (same).
119. 186 F.3d at 1220.
120. Id.
121. 480 F.3d at 1084.
122. Id. at 1085 (quoting Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133
F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 1998)).
123. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2002)).

1408

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1393

actions" of public entities. 126 The Ninth Circuit did not address the
disjunctive clause in Title 11.127 Because the first clause encompassed
arrest, it was presumably unnecessary.
The Fourth Circuit has not addressed its textual theory of why
Title II applies to arrest. 128 In Waller, the Fourth Circuit analyzed a
reasonable accommodation claim involving arrest, but it declined to
engage in meaningful textual analysis. 129 Instead, it held that "any duty
of reasonable accommodation that might have existed was satisfied"
under the facts of the case. 130 It deferred the broader Title II question
to another day.131
B. If Title II Applies to Arrest, What Is the ProperStandardfor
EvaluatingPolice Conduct?
Assuming that Title II applies to the context of arrest, as a
majority of courts conclude, the next question is how to properly
evaluate whether police conduct violates its nondiscrimination
mandate. There are two types of Title II claims that courts recognize in
the context of arrest: wrongful arrest and reasonable accommodation. 132
Each apply in distinct factual circumstances. 1 3 3 This Section analyzes
both claims as applied to the arrest of a person with mental illness.
Moreover, it examines two potential limitations on the reasonable
accommodation theory: exigent circumstances 1 34 and direct threats. 135
1. Wrongful Arrest Theory
An individual with a disability may have a Title II claim under
a theory of wrongful arrest if the police erroneously perceived the lawful

&

126. 292 F.3d at 1076-77.
127. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232.
128. See Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009).
129. Id. at 174-75.
130. Id. at 176.
131. Id. at 175 ("[It] is a broader proposition than is needed to decide this case.").
132. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 174; Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216,
1220-21 (10th Cir. 1999).
133. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 174; Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220-21.
134. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (finding that exigent circumstances inform the
reasonableness analysis); Waller, 556 F.3d at 175 (same); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d
1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).
135. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016) ("[A] public entity [is not required] to permit an individual
to participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity when that
individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others."); Petitioners' Brief at 17, City
County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (arguing the applicability
of this regulation to the context of arrest).
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effects of her disability as illegal activity. 136 For example, in Lewis v.
Truitt, a man who was deaf brought a Title II claim after he was beaten
and arrested for failing to follow police commands. 137 In fact, he simply
could not hear the officers-an effect of his disability. 138 Similarly, in
Jackson v. Town of Sanford, a man who had suffered a stroke in the
past was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated.13 9 In fact,
his unsteadiness and slurred speech stemmed from his stroke-again,
effects of his disability. 140 In both cases, the courts allowed the Title II
claim to proceed, finding that Congress intended the ADA to apply to
these factual circumstances. 14 1
Courts have resisted the application of the wrongful arrest
theory to the context of arresting a person with mental illness. 142 While
there are limited situations where it could apply, the circumstances of
the arrest often do not align with the theory. Importantly, a wrongful
arrest claim can only succeed if the effects of the person's disability were
lawful in fact and only misperceived as criminal. 143 If the actions
precipitating the arrest were actually unlawful, the claim will fail. 144 In
a majority of the Title II cases brought by people with mental illness,
the actions precipitating arrest are unlawful. 145 For example, in
Sheehan, a woman threatened the police and approached them with a
knife;14 6 in Waller, a man held his girlfriend hostage in their
apartment;1 47 and, in Gohier, an individual used "assaultive conduct"
towards the police. 148 Thus, this claim is often precluded by the
circumstances of the arrest-creating a need for an alternative theory,

136. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 174; Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220.
137. 960 F. Supp. 175, 176-77 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
138. Id.
139. Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994).
140. Id.
141. Lewis, 960 F. Supp. at 178 (citing a House Judiciary Committee report contemplating a
need to avoid erroneous arrest); Jackson, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 n.12 (same); see also supra note
67 and accompanying text (quoting the same House Judiciary Committee report).
142. See, e.g., Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing both theories, but only analyzing under a reasonable accommodation theory); Gohier
v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to find the wrongful arrest theory
applicable to the facts of the case).
143. See Lewis, 960 F. Supp. at 178 (allowing apply a wrongful arrest claim to proceed because
the actions precipitating the arrest were in fact lawful); Jackson, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 n.12
(same).
144. See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233 (declining to apply the wrongful arrest theory because
the actions precipitating the arrest were unlawful); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221-22 (same).
145. See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1218-20; Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville,
556 F.3d 171, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2009); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221-22.
146. 743 F.3d at 1218-20.
147. 556 F.3d at 172-73.
148. 186 F.3d at 1221.
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one that requires accommodation even when the individual's conduct is
criminal.
2. Reasonable Accommodation Theory
A person with a disability may have a Title II claim under a
theory of reasonable accommodation if the police "failed to reasonably
accommodate the person's disability in the course of investigation or
arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that
process than other arrestees." 149 This claim is usually framed as a
failure to provide modifications, adopt policies and procedures, or
adequately train police officers to safely interact with people with
mental illness and particularly those experiencing crisis.1 50
Of the circuit courts that have concluded that Title II
encompasses arrest, all but one have also adopted the reasonable
accommodation theory. The outlier is the Tenth Circuit, which simply
declined to evaluate the theory on procedural grounds. 15 1 In Gohier, the
Tenth Circuit evaluated a Title II claim alleging a failure to "treat and
protect" a man with paranoid schizophrenia when the police shot and
killed him. 152 While the court held that Title II applied to the police
encounter, it declined to evaluate the reasonable accommodation theory
because the plaintiff affirmatively disclaimed reliance on it. 153 Instead,
the court evaluated the claim under the wrongful arrest theory, 154
finding that the plaintiffs "assaultive conduct" was unlawful and thus
precluded the claim. 155
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have recognized the
reasonable accommodation theory in the context of arrest. 156 In support
of their position, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits cited a DOJ
regulation mandating "reasonable modifications in policies, practices,

149. Id. at 1220-21.
150. See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (claiming "the officers failed to reasonably
accommodate [the plaintiffs] disability by forcing their way back into her room without taking her
mental illness into account and without employing tactics that would have been likely to resolve
the situation without injury to herself or others"); Waller, 556 F.3d at 173 (claiming that the city
was guilty of "failing to properly train officers in dealing with the disabled").
151. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221.
152. Id. at 1217-18.
153. Id. at 1222.
154. Id. at 1221-22; see also supra Section II.B. 1 (explaining the wrongful arrest theory).
155. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1218, 1221-22 (denying the plaintiff "leave to amend her complaint
to allege a claim under the ADA" because the proposed amendment would be "futile" and "subject
to dismissal").
156. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014); Waller
ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade
County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007).
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or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability."1 5 7 Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit, while not mentioning the Title II regulation, pointed to the
definitions section of Title I of the ADA, which defines "discrimination"
to include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability."15 8

The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have framed the
reasonableness analysis as a fact-specific inquiry that depends on the
totality of the circumstances. 15 9 Such circumstances may include the
nature and history of a person's mental illness; the officer's knowledge
of the individual's disability; the physical setting and conditions giving
rise to the incident; and the presence, degree, and immediacy of danger
to the person with a disability, the officers, or the general public.
Exigent circumstances are particularly salient to the reasonableness
analysis 160 and thus are further examined in Section II.B.3.
Reasonable accommodations for a person with a mental
disability are ordinarily a question of fact1 61 and may include
modifications to police activities, policies, and training. For example, in
Sheehan (described in the Introduction), the Ninth Circuit held that
reasonable accommodations could include employing "non-threatening
communications" and "less confrontational tactics," allowing "the
passage of time to defuse the situation," or waiting for backup. 162 It
acknowledged, however, that this was ultimately a question for the
jury. 163
In practice, disability rights and mental health advocates
support close coordination between the police and mental health
professionals in order to effectively accommodate people with
disabilities. 164 Many communities have developed specialized programs

157. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012)); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at
1082 (same).
158. Waller, 556 F.3d at 174 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006)).
159. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175 ("Reasonableness in law is generally
assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances . . . ."); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085-86
(commenting that the reasonable accommodation is highly fact-specific inquiry and that
reasonableness must be decided "case-by-case based on numerous factors").
160. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175; Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085.
161. See supra notes 59-64, 159 and accompanying text (providing cases that assert that what
constitutes reasonable accommodation is a fact-intensive inquiry).
162. 743 F.3d at 1233, rev'd in part on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (finding
that a reasonable jury could conclude these accommodations were reasonable).
163. Id.
164. See H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental Health, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1266,
1268 (2002); Pamila Lew et al., An Ounce of Prevention:Law Enforcement Trainingand Mental
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to facilitate this relationship.1 6 5 Some police departments hire mental
health professionals to provide on-site or telephone consultations to
officers in the field. 166 Other departments contract with professionals,
who then directly respond to the crisis. 167 Still others have mental
health providers and advocates that provide specialized training to all
or most of their officers. 168
The most common method of safely accommodating people with
mental disabilities is through the use of a Crisis Intervention Team
("CIT") or Mobile Crisis Team ("MCT"'). 1 69 CITs and MCTs are programs
that extensively train a small, specialized unit of police officers in
mental illness and non-violent communications and tactics, with the
goal of always having a team "on call" and ready to respond
appropriately. 170 These programs rely on close community partnerships
among police, mental health professionals, advocacy coalitions, and
people with disabilities to identify and implement safe police
practices. 17 1 These arrangements have been shown to reduce the
incidence of arrest of people with mental illness by as much as nineteen
percent.172
These are just a few of the methods that police have adopted to
guarantee consistent observation of Title II's nondiscrimination
mandate. Notably, these programs focus not only on modifications to
police activity during arrest, but also to department policies and
training before the arrest. 173 Because the reasonable accommodation
theory is a viable claim for people who are mentally ill and mistreated
during arrest, such programs are essential to Title II compliance.

Health CrisisIntervention, DISABILITY RTS. CAL. 10-14 (Aug. 2014), http://www.disabilityrightsca
.org/pubs/CM5101.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6Z-J37K].
165. See Judy Hails & Randy Borum, Police Trainingand Specialized Approaches to Respond
to People with Mental Illnesses, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 52, 54 ( 2003); Lamb et al., supra note 164,
at 1268; Lew et al., supra note 164, at 10-14.
166. Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 54; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268.
167. Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 54; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268.
168. Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 54; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268.
169. See Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 58-60; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268-69;
Lew et al., supra note 164, at 12-16.
170. Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 58-60; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268-69; Lew
et al., supra note 164, at 12-16.
171. Hails & Borum, supra note 165, at 58-60; Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268-69; Lew
et al., supra note 164, at 12-16.
172. Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 1268 ("Studies that have evaluated such [mobile crisis]
teams found that they had arrest rates ranging from 2 to 13 percent (with an average of less than
7 percent) . . . , in contrast to an arrest rate of 21 percent for contacts between non-specialized
police officers and persons who were apparently mentally ill.").
173. See infra Sections III.B-C (arguing that this distinction is important to analyzing the role
of exigencies in the reasonable accommodation theory).
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However, as examined next, the presence of exigencies may limit a
plaintiffs ability to recover under this theory.17 4
3. The Role of Exigent Circumstances
Exigent circumstances, for the purpose of this analysis, exist
when there is a perceived danger to a police officer or the public that is,
at least in part, caused by a person's unlawful activity. Such
circumstances can and have arisen during mental health crises. For
example, in Hainze, an exigency arose when Kim Hainze threatened
suicide and approached the police with a knife;17 5 and in Sheehan, an
exigency arose when Teresa Sheehan, who was refusing to take her
medication or speak with a psychologist, threatened to kill a social
worker and the police.17 6 Whether and how exigencies impact the Title
II analysis is integral-it can mean the difference between holding the
police accountable for the injury or death of a person in crisis and
allowing needless harm to continue.
All of the circuit courts that have evaluated Title II's
applicability to arrest find a significant role for exigencies in the
analysis.17 7 The courts take one of two approaches: either an exigency
exempts a police officer from a duty to reasonably accommodate in the
first instance, thus removing the analysis from Title II altogether; 178 or
the exigency informs the content of the accommodation, that is, what is
"reasonable" under the circumstances. 179
The Fifth Circuit has held that exigencies during the course of
arrest exempt a police officer from a Title II duty. 18 0 As detailed in
Section II.A. 1, there is no textual support in the ADA for this categorical
exception. 181 Neither the statute nor its implementing regulations
address it.182 Likewise, the DOJ's reasonable accommodation regulation
does not mention exigencies.1 83
174. See infra Section II.B.3 (discussing the role of exigent circumstances).
175. 207 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text
(describing the facts of the case in more detail).
176. 743 F.3d 1211, 1217-20 (9th Cir. 2014); see supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text
(describing the facts of the case in more detail).
177. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171,
175 (4th Cir. 2009); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007); Hainze,
207 F.3d at 799.
178. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801; see supra Section II.A.1.
179. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175; Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085.
180. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801; see supra Section II.A.1.
181. Rau & Brooker, supranote 96, at 41 ("This exception is broad and has no statutory textual
support in the ADA.").
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2012); Rau & Brooker, supra note 96, at 41.
183. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016).
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The other circuits disagree with the Fifth Circuit's approach;
however, they still recognize some role of exigent circumstances in the
Title II analysis. 18 4 The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits treat
exigencies as one of a totality of circumstances that inform the
reasonableness analysis under the reasonable accommodation
theory.18 Significantly, each has held that the existence of an exigency
may render any accommodation unreasonable.1 86 The Eleventh Circuit
explains: "[T]he question is whether, given criminal activity and safety
concerns, any modification of police procedures is reasonable before the
police physically arrest a criminal suspect, secure the scene, and ensure
that there is no threat to the public or officer's safety."1 87
For example, it may be unreasonable to provide any
accommodation to an individual who is holding people hostage.1 88 In
Waller, the Fourth Circuit found all accommodations unreasonable
under Title II because of the exigencies created when Rennie Hunt
refused to let his girlfriend leave their apartment.189 In this incident, a
concerned friend called 911 to report the situation and Rennie's history
of mental illness.1 90 The police and a hostage specialist attempted
negotiations, however, when Rennie verbally threatened the police, an
Emergency Response Team forced their way into the house. 19 1 The team
shot and killed Rennie.1 92 The plaintiff, Rennie's surviving sister,
alleged that the police failed to reasonably accommodate Rennie's
disability when they agitated him by yelling and banging on the door,
never attempted to contact a mental health professional or family
member, and never considered administering medication.193 The court
rejected the claim, explaining: "Accommodations that might be expected
when time is of no matter become unreasonable to expect when time is

184. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175; Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085; see also
supra Section II.A.2. (discussing these cases in more detail).
185. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 ("[E]xigent circumstances inform the reasonableness
analysis under the ADA, just as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the Fourth
Amendment."); Waller, 556 F.3d at 175 ("[I]t is clear that exigency is not irrelevant.
Reasonableness in law is generally assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, and
exigency is one circumstance that bears materially on the inquiry into reasonableness under the
ADA."); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 ("[E]xigent circumstances ... go more to the reasonableness of
the requested ADA modification than whether the ADA applies in the first instance.").
186. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175; Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085.
187. Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085.
188. See Waller, 556 F.3d at 172-73, 175.
189. Id. at 172-73.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 173.
193. Id. at 175.
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of the essence." 194 Thus, exigent circumstances may limit the scope of
expected modifications under the reasonable accommodation theory.
4. The Direct Threat Exception
The existence of a "direct threat" may also place a limit on the
reasonable accommodation theory. 195 In defining a "qualified
individual," a DOJ regulation states that the ADA "does not require a
public entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from
the services, programs, or activities of that public entity when that
individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others."19 6 On
appeal to the Supreme Court in 2015, the Petitioners in Sheehan argued
that this regulation exempted police officers from providing any
accommodation to Teresa Sheehan. 197 They reasoned that, because
Teresa posed a significant safety risk to others, she was not "qualified"
to "participate in or benefit from" her arrest. 198
Respondents countered that the direct threat regulation does
not apply to a Title II reasonable accommodation claim. 199 They
emphasized that this regulation is based on the ADA's "safety
principle," a statutory exception to Title I and Title III that contains
substantially similar language to the regulation. 200 Congress, however,
did not incorporate this principle, or any other statutory exceptions,
into Title 11.201 Thus, as Respondents suggested, it is questionable
whether the direct threat regulation should apply here. Moreover, even
if it were applicable, Respondents argued that its extension to the
context of arrest would make no sense. 202 Unlike a situation where a
person "wanted to ride a city bus or attend a public meeting for reasons
unrelated to [his or her] disability," here, the "activity was involuntary
and the very reason for providing the service relates specifically to the
individual's disability." 203 They explain:

194. Id.
195. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 135, at 17 (arguing that the direct threat exception
disqualifies the plaintiff from Title II protection).
196. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016) (emphasis added). A "direct threat" is defined as a "significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2016).
197. Petitioners' Brief, supranote 135, at 17.
198. Id. at 17, 22.
199. Brief for Respondent at 26-29, City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct.
1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412).
200. Id. at 26-27.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 27-29.
203. Id. at 27.
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It makes no sense to provide [a] service to mentally disabled individuals because they are
disabled but then conclude that the same illness that causes them to be disabledwhether dementia, Alzheimer's, epilepsy, schizophrenia, autism, depression, diabetic
hypoglycemia, or any other illness that can sometimes cause erratic, irrational, or
seemingly uncooperative behavior-also triggers an exception to the ADA's non204
discrimination mandate.

The Supreme Court declined to evaluate the direct threat
exception in Sheehan, dismissing the Title II question as improvidently
granted. 205 Likewise, lower courts have yet to take up the question.
Therefore, the pertinence of the direct threat exception, as it relates to
the reasonable accommodation theory, is still unclear.
III. THE LOGICAL AND ETHICAL SOLUTION:
TITLE II REQUIRES REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DURING ARRESTWITHOUT EXCEPTION

The solution to this multilayered circuit split is to apply Title II
of the ADA to the context of arrest and require police officers and
departments to provide reasonable accommodations to people with
mental disabilities during the course of investigation and arrest.
Specifically, reasonable accommodations should include modifications
both to the police officer's arrest tactics and to the police department's
policies and training. Moreover, exigent circumstances should be closely
scrutinized before relieving police of their Title II duty. This approach
gives effect to the plain language and broad purposes of the ADA, while
also promoting the safety of all parties to a police encounter.
A. Title II Applies to the Context of Arrest
Title II of the ADA applies to police officer conduct during the
course of arrest of a person with mental illness. The plain language of
the statute, its interpretations by the Supreme Court and DOJ, its
express purposes, and its legislative history all support this
conclusion. 206 Additionally, a majority of the circuit courts support this
interpretation. 207 The Fifth Circuit's opposing view, while reasonably

204. Id. at 27-28.
205. City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1772-74. The Petitioners made
a fundamentally different argument in the Ninth Circuit and changed it only after certiorari was
granted. See id. at 1772-74, 1779. As a result, the Court dismissed the Title II question as
improvidently granted and harshly criticized the Petitioners' "bait-and-switch tactics." Id. The
Court declined to comment on both the ADA's applicability to the context of arrest and the direct
threat regulation. Id.
206. See supra Section II.A.2.
207. See supra Section II.A.2.
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concerned with police and public safety, is unsupported by the statute
and contrary to congressional intent. 208
The text of the ADA supports its application to the arrest of a
person with mental illness. A successful Title II claim must contain
three elements: (1) the plaintiff is qualified and disabled; (2) a public
entity excluded her from participation in or denied her the benefits of
its services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against
her; and (3) such exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by reason of
her disability. 209 The first and third elements are not at issue here. The
first element is easily met, as mental illness is an explicitly recognized
disability 210 and, with the exception of the direct threat regulation (the
applicability of which is disputed in Section III.D), there is no reason to
believe individuals with mental illness are not "otherwise qualified." 211
Criminal behavior or involuntary participation in an activity cannot
disqualify an individual from ADA protection. 212 Likewise, the third
element is not problematic-it only requires a showing of a nexus
between the requested accommodation and the person's mental
disability. 213
The second element logically includes police conduct during the
course of arrest. First, a police department and its officers undisputedly
qualify as "public entities" because they are a "department . .. or other
instrumentality of a State . . . or local government." 2 14 There is no
statutory exception to this definition, 215 and even the Fifth Circuit has
conceded that police are public entities. 216 Second, arrest can plainly be
considered an "activity" of the police officer, the "benefits" of which are
denied when reasonable accommodations are not provided. In addition
to the clear textual argument that arrest is a police "activity," Section
504 of the Rehab Act, a DOJ regulation, and a DOJ guidance document
all support this interpretation. Section 504, which is coextensive with
Title II, defines "program or activity" to include "all of the operations"
of a public entity. 217 Likewise, a DOJ regulation explains that Title II
"applies to all services, programs, and activities provided or made

208.
209.
detail).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See supraSection II.A.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); see supra Section I.B (describing these elements in further
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) (2012) (defining a public entity).
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000).
29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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available by public entities." 218 Moreover, a guidance document from
the same agency expressly discusses its application to arrest. 219
However, it has been argued that police do not provide arrestees
with the "benefits" of that activity, at least as those terms are ordinarily
understood. 220 Yet, the Supreme Court has interpreted the benefit
requirement quite broadly, positing that it may include any "theoretical
benefit," even to individuals who are involuntarily confined. 221 Here, a
benefit could include the protections police normally afford arrestees,
such as proper police training and not being subjected to excessive force.
Alternatively, it may not even be necessary to prove an individual has
been denied the benefits of arrest because the disjunctive in the statute
indicates a second independent claim-that the plaintiff was otherwise
"subjected to discrimination." 222 This phrase is not qualified with an
"activity" or "benefit" requirement. As discussed in Section II.B,
discrimination should include a failure to provide reasonable
accommodation to an individual with mental illness.
Moreover, applying the ADA to the context of arrest is necessary
to effectuate the broad purpose of the ADA. The statute's express goal
is to provide "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 223
Additionally, in numerous provisions, the ADA's text references the
elimination of widespread societal disadvantage. 2 2 4 This broad
mandate, which is also exhibited by the breadth of the ADA's
provisions, 225 demonstrates congressional intent to eliminate
discrimination in all facets of society. It would be absurd to apply the
ADA to all public entities, in an attempt to eliminate widespread
discrimination, and yet exempt its application to a crucial public
context-one that disproportionately results in injury and death to the

218. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
219. Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State
and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B (2016) ('The general regulatory obligation
to modify policies, practices, or procedures requires law enforcement to make changes in policies
that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities.").
220. See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (referencing the lower
court's ruling that "police protection is not an individualized benefit of a public entity's 'services,
programs, or activities,' as required by the ADA"); Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160
(W.D. Wash. 1999), abrogatedby Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that "an arrest is not the type of service, program, or activity from which
a disabled person could be excluded or denied the benefits").
221. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
224. See supranotes 40-42 and accompanying text.
225. See supranotes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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protected class. 2 2 6 Indeed, Congress even expressly contemplated Title
II's application to discriminatory arrest, as evidenced in a House
Judiciary Committee report 227 and a transcript from a congressional
debate. 228
Finally, the majority of circuit courts support Title II's
application to police conduct during arrest. 229 The Fifth Circuit is an
outlier, reading an exception into the ADA as it applies to arrest. 2 3 0 It

justifies this categorical exemption by pointing to "exigent
circumstances" that create a risk to officer and public safety. 23 1 These
concerns warrant serious consideration and may have some place in the
analysis. However, foreclosing Title II's application to arrest in the first
instance is inconsistent with the ADA. It is completely unsupported by
the text of the statute and its implementing regulations, which contain
no exception for arrest and, indeed, do not even mention exigencies. 2 32
It is also contrary to the broad purposes of the Act and its legislative
history, which support Title II's broad application to all activities by
public entities. 233
Most importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit's safety
justification is misguided and underinclusive. In defending its
exception as avoiding "unnecessary risk to innocents," 234 the Fifth
Circuit failed to acknowledge one other innocent: the individual
experiencing a mental health crisis. Although not always the case,
mental illness can be a contributing factor to the conduct precipitating
arrest. The protection of the person with a disability should be valued
just as highly as that of the police officers and general public. Indeed,
is this equality of treatment not what the ADA was enacted to achieve?

.

226. See supra Introduction.
227. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990):
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often necessary to provide
training to public employees about disability. . . . [P]ersons who have (disabilities] are
frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers have not received
proper training in the recognition of and aid for [their disability]. . . . Such
discriminatory treatment based on disability can be avoided by proper training.
228. 136 CONG. REC. H2599-01, H2633-01 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levine):
One area that should be specifically addressed by the ADA's regulations should be the
issue of nondiscrimination by police. Regretfully, it is not rare for persons with
disabilities to be mistreated by police. Sometimes this is due to persistent myths and
stereotypes about disabled people. At other times, it is actually due to mistaken
conclusions drawn by the police officer witnessing a disabled person's behavior.
[T]hese mistakes are avoidable and should be considered illegal under the [ADA].
229. See supra Section II.A.2.
230. See supra Section II.A.1.
231. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000).
232. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
234. Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
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As such, the Fifth Circuit's approach is untenable; Title II should apply
to the context of arrest.
B. The ReasonableAccommodation Theory Is a Logical Application of
Title II and Mandates Modifications to Police Conduct and Training
The reasonable accommodation theory is a logical application of
Title II and mandates modifications to a police officer's arrest tactics
and the department's training policies. This theory, which is the most
viable Title II claim for police mistreatment of individuals with mental
illness, 23 5 is supported by a DOJ regulation and all circuit courts that
both find Title II applicable to arrest and consider the merits of the
theory. 236 As such, plaintiffs can and should bring a Title II claim for a
failure to provide modifications, adopt policies and procedures, or
adequately train police officers to safely interact with people with
mental disabilities.
The reasonable accommodation theory is a legitimate
application of Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by
public entities. 237 Although discrimination is not defined within Title II,
the DOJ and a majority of circuit courts that have recognized Title II's
application to arrest have interpreted it to mandate reasonable
modifications during arrest. 2 3 8 The only court that did not adopt it (the
Tenth Circuit) did so only because the plaintiff affirmatively disclaimed
reliance on it.239 Thus, the court declined to evaluate the theory and did
not reject it on its merits. 240
In the context of arrest of an individual with mental illness,
reasonable accommodations should include modifications both to the
police officer's arrest tactics and to the police department's training
policies. Although reasonableness is ordinarily a question of fact, 241 a
failure to modify practice, policy, or procedure in both of these areas (to
a proportional extent 24 2 ) should be considered unreasonable in all
circumstances. Indeed, Congress expressly contemplated modifications

235. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the two substantive theories courts have applied to the
context of arrest). Although the wrongful arrest theory is feasible, plaintiffs are often precluded
from its application because their actions are unlawful. See supra Section I.B.1.
236. See supra Section II.B.2.
237. See supra Section I.B (detailing the elements of a Title II claim).
238. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016) ("A public entity shall make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability."); supra Section II.B.2.
239. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 59-64, 159 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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to both police tactics during arrest 2 4 3 and police training before arrest 2 4 4

in creating ADA. Without this two-prong approach, the safety of the
arrestee, officer, and public may be compromised and exigencies may be
unnecessarily created. 245
First, each police officer should modify her communication,
investigation, and arrest tactics in accordance with each individual's
mental disability, the officer's knowledge of that disability, and the
circumstances surrounding the incident. To the extent possible,
modifications should be individualized in accordance with the nature
and history of a person's mental illness. Additionally, time permitting,
officers should make an effort to learn about the person and her
disability (perhaps from the emergency caller) in order to inform this
individualization. Examples of modifications may include employing
less confrontational tactics and nonthreatening communications or
simply waiting for time to diffuse the situation. 246 If an officer is unsure
of how to respond, they should call a mental health professional to the
scene, consult with a professional over the phone, or call in a Crisis
Intervention Team or Mobile Crisis Team. 2 4 7
Second, it is objectively unreasonable for a police department to
inadequately train their officers, or a specialized team, to identify and
safely interact with individuals with mental disabilities. Police officers
frequently encounter people with mental illness during the course of
their duties, 248 and there are numerous police training approaches
readily available. 249 It is manifestly irresponsible (and, as this Note
argues, prohibited by the ADA) to improperly prepare officers to safely
investigate and arrest people with mental disabilities. It creates danger
not only to the arrestee, but also to the general public and the police
officer. Proper training can enable safer interactions, prevent
unnecessary exigencies, 250 and correct widespread misperceptions
about mental disabilities. 251 As such, to qualify as "reasonable" under
243. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing a transcript from a congressional
debate that contemplates police mistreatment during arrest as a violation of the ADA).
244. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing a House Judiciary Committee
report that suggests that "proper training" of police can satisfy the reasonable modification
requirement).

245. See infra Section III.C.
246. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
250. Elizabeth Hervey Osborn, Comment, What Happened to "Paul's Law'?: Insights on
Advocating for Better Trainingand Better Outcomes in Encounters Between Law Enforcement and
Persons with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 333, 354 (2008); see infra Section
III.C.
251. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

1422

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1393

the reasonable accommodation theory, there should be modifications
not only to police conduct during the arrest, but also to police training
before the arrest.2 52

C. Exigent CircumstancesShould Never Exempt Police from a Duty to
Reasonably Accommodate and Should Have a Limited Role in the
ReasonablenessAnalysis
Exigencies 253 should never categorically exempt a police officer
from a Title II duty to reasonably accommodate during arrest. As
argued in Section II.A., the Fifth Circuit's exception, which removes
police conduct during an exigency from Title II altogether, is completely
unsupported by the text of the statute and its implementing regulations
and is contrary to congressional intent. 254 However, exigencies may
have some role-albeit minor-in the Title II analysis.
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' treatment of
exigencies is, in theory, the legal analysis that should be followed. These
courts agree that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness of
an accommodation, as an exigency is one of many factors to be
considered when assessing the totality of the circumstances. 2 5 5 This
approach is consistent with the text of the statute and the DOJ's
reasonable modification regulation, which has been consistently
interpreted to require a fact-specific inquiry into all circumstances
surrounding the arrest. 256 It also gives effect to practical concerns of
officer and public safety-allowing the police enough flexibility to safely
approach each encounter, while not exempting them from a Title II duty
to make this assessment in the first instance, as the Fifth Circuit's
approach invites. 257
In practice, the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' approach
affords disproportionate weight to exigent circumstances. The courts
purport the role of exigencies to be minor-it is just "one circumstance"
among the totality. Of note, however, is that exigencies released the
police from ADA liability in both Bircoll258 and Waller,259 while Sheehan
252. The distinction between modifications during and before the arrest is also relevant to the
role of exigencies in the reasonableness analysis. As argued in Section III. C, while exigencies may
render any accommodations unreasonable during the arrest, it should never release the police
department from its responsibility to properly train its officers before the arrest.
253. For the purposes of this Note, an exigency is defined as a perceived danger to a police
officer or the public that is, at least in part, caused by an individual's unlawful activity.
254. See supra Section Il.A.
255. See supra Sections IJ.B.2, II.B.3.
256. See supra Sections II.B.2, II.B.3.
257. See supra Section II.B.3.
258. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1086 (11th Cir. 2007).
259. Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009).
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is still on remand for further proceedings. 260 As they recognize, the
existence of an exigency may render any accommodation unreasonable
under the circumstances. 26 1 Given this trend, one has to question
whether this "consideration" is, in practice, a reframing of the Fifth
Circuit's exception. 262
Exigent circumstances should have a limited role in the
reasonableness analysis and should be closely scrutinized before
relieving the police officer and department from liability. Specifically,
although an exigency may render any accommodation unreasonable
during the arrest,it should never release the police department from its
responsibility to properly train its officers before the arrest. There is no
threat to police or public safety before a crisis begins, and thus the
reasoning behind affording exigencies a controlling weight in the
reasonableness analysis does not apply to this context. 263 Further, as
discussed in Section 1II.B, a failure to train police to identify and safely
interact with individuals with mental disabilities is objectively
unreasonable. In the context of exigencies, proper training is
particularly crucial. When an individual is experiencing a mental
health crisis, a situation can easily be mistaken for an exigency, or an
untrained officer's actions can unnecessarily create an exigency. 264
For example, there is a documented misperception among police
officers that individuals with mental illness are more prone to
violence. 265 This mistaken belief may cause an officer to approach a
person more aggressively, thus escalating the situation and creating an
exigency. 266 Likewise, an individual in crisis may not follow police
commands-an inaction that may be a symptom of his or her
disability. 267 This lack of response may cause an officer to attempt to
physically restrain the person, 268 thus escalating the situation and
creating an exigency.
These are just two examples from a long list of mitigating
circumstances that can contribute to unnecessary exigencies during a
police encounter. To be sure, there are certainly situations in which a
person with a mental disability poses a real and imminent threat for
260. Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 793 F.3d 1009, 1009 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.).
261. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085; Waller, 556 F.3d at 175.
262. See supra Section II.A.1.
263. See supra Section II.B.3.
264. Osborn, supra note 250, at 354.
265. Fischer, supra note 16, at 171-72 (citing Amy Watson et al., Police Officers' Attitudes
Toward and DecisionsAbout Persons with Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS, 49, 52 (2004)).
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1770-71 (2015)
(describing the circumstances that led to the shooting of Teresa Sheehan).
268. See id.

1424

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1393

which they are culpable. However, given the disproportionate amount
of injury and death resulting from these encounters, 2 69 such situations
at least warrant a close examination into the causal factors for the
exigency and whether the police department adequately trained its
officers. Thus, exigencies do have a role in informing the reasonableness
analysis; however, that role should be closely analyzed before releasing
an officer from liability under Title II.
D. The Direct Threat Exception Should Not Apply to the Reasonable
Accommodation Theory
The direct threat exception cited by the Petitioners in Sheehan
should not apply to the Title II reasonable accommodation theory. The
plain language of the statute and the DOJ direct threat regulation
support this conclusion. 270 Moreover, its application to the arrest of a
person with a mental disability would produce absurd results and run
contrary to the purpose of the ADA. 2 7 1
The text of Title II of the ADA, in contrast to Title I and Title III,
does not include a statutory exception for direct threats. 272 Despite this,
the DOJ still promulgated a Title II direct threat regulation. 273
However, the regulation's text precludes its application to the arrest of
a person with a mental disability. The regulation provides: "a public
entity [is not required] to permit an individual to participate in or
benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity
when that individual poses a direct threat." 2 7 4 It would make no sense

to apply this exception when the service or activity (the arrest) is
involuntary and the individual's mental illness is the reason for the
police encounter. 275
First, the regulation only reaches situations where a public
entity "permit[s]" an individual to participate in a service. 276 A police
officer does not "permit" an individual to participate in an arrest; it is
involuntarily forced upon him or her. 2 7 7 As explained by the
Respondents in Sheehan, this is not a situation where, for example, a

269. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Section II.B.4.
271. See supra Section II.B.4.
272. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
273. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016).
274. Id.
275. Brief for Respondent, supra note 199, at 27.
276. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a).
277. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 199, at 27-28 (explaining that it makes no sense to
apply the direct threat regulation to the context of arrest because participation is involuntary).
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person with a disability chooses to ride a public bus. 27 8 Here, the
"service" is being thrust upon the individual by reason of a disability. 279
Such a scenario does not fit within the plain language of the regulation.
Second, it would be absurd to apply this regulation when the
same disability that qualifies an individual for ADA protection is also a
contributing factor for the police encounter. 280 In effect, it would mean
that an individual's mental disability simultaneously qualifies and
disqualifies the person from ADA protection. 28 1 It would also mean that
virtually no individual experiencing a mental health crisis that
precipitated a police encounter would be protected under the ADA. This
would produce absurd resultS 2 8 2 and run contrary to the broad purpose
of the ADA. 2 8 3

Moreover, even if the direct threat regulation did apply to the
arrest of a person with mental illness, it notably only exempts a public
entity from permitting an individual "to participatein or benefit from
the services, programs, or activities of that public entity." 284 It does not
mention the potential second textual basis for a Title II claim-when
an individual is otherwise "subject[ed] to discrimination." 28 5 As such,
the regulation may not apply if a claim can and does stem from this
second, disjunctive Title II clause. Because the direct threat exception
is unsupported by both the statute and implementing regulation, it
should not apply to the Title II reasonable accommodation theory.
CONCLUSION
A person with a mental disability is substantially more likely to
be injured or killed during a police encounter than other individuals. 286
Despite this disturbing trend, some courts dispute whether these
individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations during arrest
under Title II of the ADA. In particular, the courts disagree on whether
Title II applies to police conduct during arrest and, if so, what the
proper standard is for evaluating that legality of that conduct.

278. See id. at 27.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 27-28.
281. See id. at 27.
282. See id.
283. See supra Section I.A. (detailing the express purpose of the ADA: to eliminate widespread
discrimination against people with disabilities, including those with mental illness, in all activities
of public entities).
284. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
285. See supranotes 115-122 and accompanying text (detailing the potential two textual bases
for a Title II claim).
286. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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The logical and ethical solution to this disagreement is to apply
Title II to arrest and allow claims to proceed on a theory of reasonable
accommodation-without exception for exigent circumstances or direct
threats. From both a legal and moral perspective, a duty under Title II
is immutable. People with mental disabilities continue to suffer from
pervasive societal discrimination. This discrimination may take the
form of explicit bias, unconscious misperceptions, or unaddressed
ignorance. Regardless, during the course of arrest, it too often manifests
through tangible injury. In an effort to combat this discrimination, not
only do courts need to recognize a cause of action through Title II, but
we, as a society, need to correct our misperceptions of mental illness
and begin viewing all people-regardless of disability-with dignity
and respect. Part of this change is to recognize when, where, and how
accommodations are needed to ensure the safety and equality of people
with mental disabilities.
Carly A. Myers*
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